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Abstract 
We investigate whether labor market regulation affects the performance difference between 
family and non-family firms across a large panel of more than 6,900 firms in 28 countries over 
10 years. We establish two main results: family firms have a performance advantage over non-
family firms in countries with less regulated labor markets, and the performance advantage of 
being family-controlled in countries with lower regulation is less pronounced in industries with 
high labor intensity and high labor volatility. These results are robust to matching and using a 
survey-based instrument for family control. Our results suggest that family control and labor 
market regulation to some extent are substitute governance mechanisms.  
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1. Introduction 
We investigate how labor market regulation (LMR) affects the performance difference between 
family and non-family firms. Family firms are dominant in most countries around the world (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999, and Faccio and Lang 2002), and many studies have 
shown that family firms perform differently from non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003, 
Perez-Gonzales 2006, Villalonga and Amit 2006, Bennedsen et al. 2007, and Miller et al. 2007). 
However, only recently have scholars started opening the black box of why family firms are 
different, by focusing on families’ special contribution to their firms (see Bertrand and Schoar 
2006, and Bennedsen et al. 2010, for surveys). 
In this paper, we focus on the role of country-level differences in LMR to explain the 
performance difference between family-controlled and non-family-controlled corporations. LMR 
is an important institutional roadblock. Regulation of labor and other types of regulation, 
including product markets and regulation of trade, have been studied extensively in the 
macroeconomic literature on barriers for growth. Studies have established that tight regulation of 
labor markets is correlated with lower growth, higher unemployment, and more rent seeking 
from incumbent firms (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, Botero et al. 2004, and Besley and Burgess 
2004). We contribute to this literature by analyzing, in general, firm-level effects of LMR on 
performance and productivity and, in particular, the differential impact of LMR on family-
controlled and non-family-controlled corporations. We emphasize that, a priori, no clear 
theoretical relationship exists between the macroeconomic results and the firm-level results we 
investigate in this paper since labor market regulation impacts incentives and performance of 
individual firms but also affects entry and exit into a market. 
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We use the OECD employment protection index to measure LMR across countries and 
time. The measure has a strong focus on protecting employees from being separated from their 
jobs and is constructed from sub-measures of regular employment protection, temporary 
employment protection, and the cost of collective dismissals. We document that significant 
variation exists in the OECD employment protection measure across countries. Importantly, this 
variation goes well beyond variation in GDP per capita and other institutional constraints such as 
investor protection and product market competition. 
By focusing on firing cost and how easy it is to separate workers from their jobs, the 
measures of LMR used in the present study shapes the form and content of labor contracts. Thus, 
strong labor market regulation reduces the freedom of designing both explicit and implicit labor 
contracts. Theoretically, when regulation increases the cost of separating workers from firms, it 
can induce both benefits and costs on the individual firm. The most obvious impact is that higher 
firing costs and less flexible use of temporary workers make it difficult for firms to adapt to fast 
changes in the business environment. This challenge can increase firm-level cost or induce firms 
to forego business opportunities because hiring more labor is risky. On the benefit side, 
protection of workers can increase the relation-specific investment by workers who are 
concerned about being held up by the company. Hence, workers who feel safer in their jobs may 
invest more in skills that are specific to the individual firm. Another firm-level benefit of 
stronger regulation is that it will serve as a barrier to entry for new firms or for foreign firms that 
are considering establishing new firms or plants in a given country. Note that if regulation is a 
powerful barrier to entry, incumbent firms may, on net, benefit from regulation even if it 
increases labor costs and overall reduces industry or country-level growth.  
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 How do labor relations interact with family control? Labor contracts both provide 
incentives for workers to supply effort and relation-specific investment and provide optimal risk 
allocation between firms and workers (Knight 1921, Bailey 1974, and Azariadis 1975). Family 
business scholars have argued that family firms are better at managing stakeholders and have a 
more loyal labor force (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997, and Lansberg 1983 and 1988). 
Recent firm-level studies have found significant differences in management practices for family-
controlled firms (Bloom and van Reenen 2007, and Bennedsen et al. 2007). Thus, it is plausible 
that family firms have a different tradeoff between worker incentives and worker insurance than 
do non-family firms. Recent literature has documented this difference using both firm-level and 
country-level data (Sraer and Thesmar 2007, Mueller and Philippon 2011, Bach and Serrano-
Velarde 2014, and Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi 2014).  These papers have established that 
family firms provide better employment insurance than non-family firms and the latter paper 
shows this is related to cross country differences in unemployment insurance. 
In this paper, we start from the above documented notion that family firms are better at 
insuring workers and paying lower wages. We then ask in which environment family firms are 
most beneficial, given that implicit labor contracts and labor market regulation both affect the 
incentives of individual workers. Family firms’ superior relationship with their workers relative 
to non-family firms gives a comparative advantage in environments where this implicit insurance 
is most valuable. Given that both implicit labor contracts and labor market regulation provide 
insurance, we claim that family firms will have a comparative advantage in countries where less 
labor market regulation exists. 
 We assemble a dataset of 6,983 firms in 28 countries (based on Lins et al. 2013). Our 
firms are large publicly-traded corporations, and we use a strict 25 percent threshold of voting 
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rights via direct or indirect family shareholdings to define family firms in our benchmark 
analysis. We collect firm-level data for these firms and investigate to what extent regulation of 
labor market and being a family firm interact. 
 The contribution of the paper can be summarized in a number of findings. First, we find 
that LMR does not, in general, have a strong impact on firm performance. Second, we find that 
family-controlled corporations have higher operating performance and return on capital 
employed relative to non-family-controlled corporations in countries with less regulated labor 
markets. Thus, the ability of family firms to protect labor seems to give them a relative 
performance advantage in less-regulated countries. Third, the comparative advantages of family 
firms in less-regulated countries are driven by those industries that are less labor intensive and 
where firm-level employment is less volatile. This finding supports the notion that the abilities of 
families to implicitly contract with labor in a way that increases relation-specific investment is 
higher in stable industries, with lower labor intensity. We confirm this insight by showing that 
employment in family firms is less volatile and that this effect is stronger in less regulated 
countries.  Fourth, the interaction effects between family control and labor market regulation that 
we observe for firm-level performance measures are not significant when we compare relative 
productivity.  
 Like most cross-sectional country studies, our analysis is subject to identification 
challenges. In particular, the choice of being a family firm may be affected by the level of 
regulation in general. This concern is supported by the observation that the share of family firms 
across countries is negatively correlated with the degree of labor market regulation. To mitigate 
this concern, we both use matching and instrumental variables techniques. We instrument the 
presence of family firms across countries using survey-based questions from the World Value 
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Survey about the strength of family values across countries. Our main findings obtain also when 
we apply instrumental variables regression methods. 
 By showing that LMR has a differential impact on family-controlled and non-family-
controlled corporations, we also contribute to a recent literature that shows how institutional 
roadblocks are important for the relative performance of family firms (Bennedsen and Fan 2014, 
and Bennedsen et al. 2013). Ellul et al. (2010) show that the strictness of inheritance laws affects 
family firms negatively. Tsoutsoura (2013) documents how the removal of inheritance taxes in 
Greece improved investment in family firms around succession, and Bennedsen and Nielsen 
(2010) document how family firm control can provide value in countries with weak investor 
protection. The notion that regulation interacts with individual governance structures like 
ownership is also a persistent theme in the law and finance literature. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our measure of 
LMR and shows that variation across countries exists beyond the variation in other institutional 
country variables. In this section, we also present our firm sample and provide summary statistics 
at the country and at the firm levels. Section 3 presents our results. We begin with univariate 
illustrations and proceed with multivariate and instrumental regressions; then, we introduce 
sample splits to provide a deeper understanding of our main interaction effect. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and summary statistics 
The focus of this paper is to study whether labor market regulation affects the performance 
difference between family and non-family firms. In this section, we provide a description of our 
data. We introduce the labor market regulation measures and how these measures compare to 
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other country-level variables such as investor protection, product market regulation, and welfare. 
We then describe the sample and control variables.  
 
2.1 Labor Market Regulation 
The OECD provides a yearly measure of employment protection based on data collected by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO uses country officials and law experts to 
collect detailed information about firing procedures, notification rules, as well as valid and 
invalid reasons for firing individuals or groups of workers. All information is aggregated into an 
employment protection indicator, which we henceforth refer to as overall employment 
protection. Importantly, for our purposes, this measure is comparable across countries.  
Figure 1 summarizes how the overall employment protection measure is constructed. The 
overall employment protection measure is composed of three sub-measures: (i) individual 
dismissal of workers with regular contracts (weighted with 5/12); (ii) regulation of temporary 
contracts (weighted with 5/12); and (iii) additional costs for collective dismissals (weighted with 
2/12). Sub-measure (i), which we henceforth refer to as regular employment protection, is the 
equally weighted mean of measures for procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for 
no-fault individual dismissals, and difficulty of dismissal—all as a function of how many years 
an employee has been on a regular contract. Sub-measure (ii), which we henceforth refer to as 
temporary employment protection, is the equally weighted mean of measures of fixed-term 
contract conditions and temporary work agency employment. This measure focuses on issues 
such as when and for which type of work a temporary contract can be used, what the maximum 
length of a single temporary contract can be, and how many times temporary contracts can be 
renewed before the worker has to be offered a regular contract. Sub-measure (iii) is henceforth 
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referred to as collective dismissal protection. This measure quantifies regulatory burdens and 
costs that go beyond regular employment protection in that they apply to the dismissal of large 
groups of workers. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
The OECD standardizes employment protection such that the measure decreases in the 
strictness of regulation on a scale from 0 to 5. We subtract this measure from 5 to obtain a 
measure that increases in labor market regulation. Table 1 summarizes the labor market measures 
by country in 2008. Countries are sorted by overall labor market protection, starting with the 
least protected country. The least protected countries are the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Ireland. The most protected countries are Turkey, Portugal, and Mexico. Inspection of the sub-
measures reveals that the three sub-measures are relatively uncorrelated (indeed, regular and 
temporary measures have a correlation of 0.34). Thus, these sub-measures are likely to capture 
different aspects of labor market protection.  
--- Table 1 about here --- 
2.2 Labor Market Regulation and other institutional roadblocks 
As we aim to explore the impact of labor market roadblocks on the performance difference 
between family and non-family firms, it is important that our LMR measure is not highly 
correlated with other country-level variables faced by firms. In the following, we focus on 
institutional roadblocks (investor protection and product market regulation) and welfare. First, 
we study the correlation between labor market regulation and two investor protection measures. 
The Anti-Self-Dealing index measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against 
self-dealing conducted by controlling shareholders (Djankov et al. 2008). The Revised Anti-
Director index is an index that ranges from 0 to 5, depending on how many of 5 different 
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shareholder rights a country fulfills (La Porta et al. 1998, and Djankov et al. 2008). Second, we 
focus on measures of economic development using the log of GDP per capita from World Bank 
and GDP growth between 2003 and 2008. Third, we examine the relation between LMR and 
measures of product market regulation provided by the OECD, namely the OECD’s overall 
product market regulation measure and its three sub-measures: barriers to entrepreneurship, 
barriers to trade and investment, and state control. 
Table 1 tabulates these roadblocks by country, and Table 2 shows correlations between 
major roadblocks, weighting each country equally. Figure 2 plots the overall LMR measure 
against major roadblocks as well as welfare, again weighting each country equally.1 
--- Table 2 and Figure 2 about here --- 
 Table 2 provides first evidence that LMR does not merely capture other country-level 
measures. Anti-self-dealing is negatively correlated with LMR, while no correlation exists 
between LMR and anti-director rights. Economic welfare—measured by GDP per capita—is 
slightly negatively correlated with LMR, while growth over the past 5 years is slightly positively 
correlated. Also, some positive correlations exist between product market competition measures 
and the sub-measures of LMR, yet clearly not all variations in LMR are explained by measures 
of competition. Figure 2 provides additional evidence by showing that none of the low 
correlations are driven by outliers.  
 In sum, LMR captures something beyond known country-level roadblocks. At the same 
time, to alleviate concerns that these country-level measures may drive our results, we include 
these country-level controls in our regressions. 
                                                            
1 Weighting countries by the number of firms or the number of observations used in our later analysis does not affect conclusions 
drawn in this section. 
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Note that Table 2 also provides insights into the LMR measure. First, overall LMR is 
positively correlated with two of its subcomponents (temporary and regular LMR) but negatively 
correlated with collective dismissal. Second, the three subcomponents are not strongly correlated 
with each other. This result leads us to investigate which of the subcomponents matter in a later 
part of our paper. 
 
2.3 Sample description  
Our baseline dataset is that constructed by Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013). The authors start 
with the December 2006 issue of OSIRIS and restrict the sample to firms that (i) are active; (ii) 
report sales, assets, operating profit, and industry for fiscal year 2005; (iii) have sales of at least 
EUR50mn and assets of at least EUR25mn; and (iv) are incorporated in countries covered by 
Djankov et al. (2008). Firms in Fama-French 48 industries with less than ten firms in total are 
removed.  
We further restrict the sample to firms that are incorporated in countries for which the 
OECD employment protection measure is available. This leaves 6,983 unique sample firms in 28 
countries. Japan (1,593), the United Kingdom (1,048), and Australia (763) are most represented. 
None of the sample countries is reflected by fewer than 30 unique firms. 
We apply the definition of family firm employed by Franks et al. (2012) and Lins, 
Volpin, and Wagner (2013). Family firm is a dummy variable equal to one if voting rights held 
by an individual or through a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control 
chain. A more detailed description of the sample selection and family-firm classification can be 
found in Franks et al. (2012). Table 3 Panel A presents our sample across countries and divided 
into total number of firms, number of family firms, and share of family firms. Twelve percent of 
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sample firms are classified as family firms. France (36%), Greece (34%), Germany (32%), and 
Italy (32%) have the largest fraction of family firms.   
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 One major challenge of using 25 percent share of ownership as the definition of family 
firms is that we leave out firms that are controlled and managed by families with a smaller 
ownership stake. Whereas this narrowing of the definition is true for all countries, it affects 
Japan disproportionally, which has many family firms that are controlled through relatively small 
ownership stakes by the family (Bennedsen et al. (2013)). As a result we categorize very few 
firms as family firms in Japan. To check that our results do not depend on this categorization, we 
repeat all our analyses by excluding Japan. This does not change the qualitative results; thus, to 
save space we only present the results for the full sample including Japan.  
 
2.4 Firm- and industry-level control variables 
Panel B of Table 3 provides a brief description of firm- and industry-level controls. All firm-
level controls are from Worldscope and Datastream. Our key performance measures are return 
on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROCE), which are constructed as earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets and as EBIT over total assets less current 
liabilities, respectively. Log(Assets) is the log of total assets. R&D/Assets is defined as research 
and development costs over total assets where, in line with the literature, research and 
development costs are assumed to be zero if missing. Leverage is defined as long-term debt 
divided by total assets. Log(Age) is the log of years since firm foundation or the log of years 
since a firm first appeared in DataStream if the foundation year is missing. Log(Cost of goods 
sold) and Log(Employees) are the log of cost of goods sold and log of number of employees, 
11 
 
respectively. These measures, along with Log(Assets), serve as proxies for capital, material, and 
labor input in the total factor productivity regressions. 
 The average sample firm has ROA of 3.8%, ROCE of 9.1%, leverage of 50.8%, 
R&D/assets of 2.5%, and Log(Assets) of 12.7, the latter reflecting the size criteria imposed by 
Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) on sample firms.  
 
3. Results 
In this section, we present our results. We begin with univariate illustrations and proceed with 
multivariate regressions, as well as matched sample and instrumental regressions. We then 
conduct industry splits and analyze employment and productivity to provide a deeper 
understanding of channels that drive our main result. We conclude with further robustness 
checks using alternative institutional roadblocks and alternative measures of employment 
protection. 
 
3.1 Univariate analysis 
As discussed earlier, the theoretical impact of higher LMR on firm performance is ambiguous. 
First, higher costs of firing workers increases overall production costs and thus reduces profits. 
Second, higher labor costs may lead firms to substitute labor for capital, thus increasing labor 
productivity. Third, higher firing costs increase job security of workers. This result may have a 
positive effect on labor productivity, if workers make larger relationship-specific investments 
into their jobs, or a negative effect, if workers exhibit less effort knowing that the likelihood of 
being fired is smaller. Finally, higher labor costs may work as a general barrier to entry, which 
reduces competition and thus allows incumbent firms to enjoy higher rents.  
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 Table 4 Panel A provides first insights into the firm-level relation between LMR and firm 
performance based on univariate analysis. We calculate firm performance, measured by return on 
assets, for firms in countries with weak and strong employment protection by family and non-
family firms. The first row shows that publicly traded firms in general have higher returns on 
assets in countries with high LMR. Given that high country-level LMR implies lower growth and 
higher unemployment, the firm-level results confirm that high LMR induces more rent to the 
individual firm and thus also reduces competition among firms. As we show below, this 
correlation does not carry over when we add control variables to the analysis. The first column 
shows that family firms in our sample have higher return on assets than non-family firms. This is 
driven by countries with low LMR, while family firms have lower ROA than non-family firms in 
countries with high LMR.  
--- Table 4 about here --- 
The difference-in-difference of family firm performance in countries with low versus 
high LMR is 3.55 percentage points. Hence, family firms have a relative performance advantage 
in countries with low LMR. Panel B measures performance by return on capital employed and 
confirms these results. Overall, this result confirms the notion that family firms’ ability to better 
insure labor is worth more in countries where labor is less protected through public labor market 
regulation. 
Figure 3 supports this insight by mapping the gap between return on assets of family and 
non-family firms (vertical axis) to the aggregate level of labor market regulation (horizontal 
axis). The line of best fit illustrates a clear negative relationship, confirming that family firms 
have a comparative advantage in countries with lower labor market regulation. The difference 
between return on assets of family and non-family firms is positive in countries with a low level 
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of labor market protection—such as in the UK, as well as in Ireland, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Denmark. The difference between return on assets of family and non-family firms 
is close to zero or negative in countries with a high level of labor market protection—such as in 
France, Norway, Turkey, and Portugal. While this illustration is based on equally weighted 
observations, results are essentially unchanged when weighting country-level observations by the 
number of sample firms. 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
Next, we consider how changes in labor market regulation impact the performance 
difference between family and non-family firms. Panel B plots changes in return on assets of 
family firms (left) and non-family firms (right) between 2003 and 2008 against changes in the 
OECD’s LMR measure, focusing on the five countries that experienced a change in the overall 
labor market protection measure during the period 2003 to 2008. We find weak evidence that an 
increase in the level of LMR is associated with lower returns on assets in family firms and higher 
returns on assets in non-family firms. Panel C combines the two figures, showing that the 
difference in return on assets closes as LMR gets stronger. While this evidence is consistent with 
the correlations before and hints at a causal link between labor market regulation and 
performance difference, we acknowledge that five countries are too few to draw general 
conclusions. We refer to the multivariate firm-level evidence that uses matching and instruments 
in the next sub-section. 
In conclusion, this subsection shows that the gap between return on assets of family firms 
and non-family firms decreases in overall labor market protection. This finding is consistent with 
the notion that family ownership provides implicit labor protection: labor market regulation and 
ownership structure are partly governance substitutes. 
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3.2 Multivariate analysis 
We now turn to multivariate analysis. Specifically, the results of the univariate analysis may be 
subject to firm-level characteristics, such as size, firm age, or industry selection. We start with 
simple multivariate OLS regressions. We then match family firms to non-family firms using a 
propensity score matching method and employ instruments variables regressions to alleviate 
selection concerns. We conclude by examining sub-measures of LMR and industry splits to hint 
at the channels that explain our results.  
 
3.2.1 LMR and firm performance 
Table 5 analyzes the impact of LMR on firm-level performance and productivity. The key 
explanatory variable is LMR. Column (1) shows that LMR does not have a statistically or 
economically significant impact on firm performance measured as operating return on assets. In 
results reported below, we confirm this for the three sub-measures (collective dismissal, regular 
LMR, or temporary LMR). In Column (4) we use return on capital employed as our performance 
measure and still do not find a correlation between labor market regulation and average firm 
performance. In unreported results, we check the correlation between average firm performance 
and protection of temporary and permanent employed workers and we limit the analysis to labor 
intensive industries where any impact should be largest. We find no significant correlation, and 
thus we conclude that firm-level return measures are not correlated with the regulative-induced 
protection of labor. On average, labor market regulation does not impact the mean performance 
of publicly traded companies in a country. The most important determinants of return over assets 
are size and country-level GDP. 
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--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
3.2.2 Family-firm performance and LMR 
Table 5 presents the main result of our multivariate analysis by documenting the differential 
impact that LMR has on family-controlled corporations relative to other firms. In Column (2), 
we add a family firm dummy in addition to the LMR dummy. The family firm dummy is 
statistically significant and economically large. The economic magnitude is such that being a 
family firm increases ROA by 2.7%. This result is confirmed in all other regressions we present, 
thus in this sample of large public traded firms, we notice that very concentrated family 
ownership (above 25 percent) is correlated with superior performance. This finding may result 
from the fact that we are looking at a) the largest firms in each country; and b) a very strict 
definition of family firms. Given that a large literature on family firm performance points to the 
importance of the definition of family firms, we do not pursue this further here (see Bennedsen, 
Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon 2010 for a discussion of the definition of family firms).  
 In Column (3), we introduce interaction effects between LMR and family firms, as we are 
particularly interested in the effect of being a family firm in low LMR environments. Most 
importantly, while on average family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of ROA, they 
outperform non-family firms even more in low LMR countries: the interaction effect is 
statistically significant at 5% level and economically important. Indeed, for a one standard 
deviation decline in LMR, ROA increases 0.98 percentage points more for family than non-
family firms.2 In columns (4) to (6), we use the return over capital employed as our performance 
measure. Our previous result is confirmed: For a one standard deviation decline in LMR, ROCE 
increases 1.58 percentage points (=2.1%*0.752) more for family than non-family firms. .  
                                                            
2 The standard deviation of LMR is 0.752 in this sample.  
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 As previously discussed, the strict definition of family firms used in this analysis means 
that we have very few family firms in Japan. In unreported regressions, we repeat the analysis of 
Table 5 (and all future tables) excluding Japan. This does not significantly affect economic 
magnitude and statistical significance of our results. 
 Thus controlling for relevant observables, we have established a negative interaction 
effect between performance difference for family and non-family ownership and the strength of 
labor market regulation.  
 
3.2.3 Controlling for selection 
In the previous subsection, we have shown a negative correlation between the performance of 
family and non-family firms and the strength of labor market regulation. Such a correlation is 
naturally plagued with endogeneity concerns. Are family and non-family firms similar across 
different levels of LMR with respect to observable and non-observable characteristics? Is the 
distribution of family firms and non-family firms within a country affected by the strength of 
labor market regulation? A family may choose to dilute ownership below the 25 percent 
threshold we use, and this choice may be affected by a country’s labor market regulation. On 
average, we do find that the share of family firms is larger in highly regulated countries. 
In a large global cross-country sample, it is very challenging to control for all possible 
endogeneity concerns. However, in the following, we provide evidence from two separate 
approaches that strengthen the claim that the correlation found above is causal.  
 Our first approach is to look at the interaction effect in a matched sample. Ideally, we 
want to compare similar family and non-family firms within each country, but firms may be 
different both in observable and unobservable ways. However, if the unobservable differences 
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are significantly correlated with observable variables, a matching approach will do a better job in 
estimating the interaction effect. Specifically, for each year, non-family firms are matched to 
family firms by country characteristics (log of GDP per capita, anti-self-dealing, anti-director 
index), industry, log(assets), R&D/assets, leverage, and age, using propensity score matching. 
This allows us to select, for each family firm, a non-family firm having similar characteristics to 
function as its control group.  
 Panel A of Table 6 shows that propensity scores are indistinguishable between matched 
sample and control group. In untabulated results, we verify that family firms and non-family 
firms in the control group have indistinguishable characteristics for every control variable. 
Univariate analysis in Panel A further confirms our prior findings that family firms outperform 
non-family firms even when we control for self-selection bias. Panel B extends the analysis to a 
multivariate setting, and again we find that the outperformance of family firms is more 
pronounced in countries with low LMR. 
--- Table 6 about here --- 
The matching approach does assure that we are comparing similar firms when we 
estimate the performance difference between family and non-family firms across countries. 
However, it does not solve other types of endogeneity challenges. For instance, in our data we 
see more family firms in countries with low LMR. Hence, we cannot rule out that LMR is one 
determinant of whether families continue owning large stakes in their firms or that families opt 
for diluting ownership, thus becoming a non-family firm according to our definition. 
 To mitigate the concern of reverse causality, we instrument family control. Our 
instrument comes from the World Value Survey and measures the importance of family values. 
The World Value survey is based on interviews with a representative sample of 1000-4000 
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individuals in each country, and these individuals are randomly chosen among the entire 
population. Thus, most of the respondents have little or no connections with the firms in our 
sample, and we therefore claim that mean survey answers are not affected by the ownership 
choices that owners in our sample make. The World Value Survey asks the question of how 
important the family is in a respondent’s life in many countries around the world over several 
waves. Respondents can answer on a scale of 1 to 4, and we have extracted the average of the 
answers for each country each year in our sample. For years in which the survey is not carried 
out, we use the mean value from the most recently available one. Following this approach, we 
have constructed a country-level measure of the importance of family values. Family values on a 
country level does impact the way families in general perceive doing business together. Strong 
family values make families more likely to continuing entrepreneurial activities within the family 
and make it more likely that a family succession is chosen when the founder retires. Thus, we 
expect that countries with strong family values will have more family firms than do countries 
with weaker family values.  
 We conclude that the World Value Survey measure of family values satisfies two 
conditions for being a valid instrument: it is not affected by the choice of being a family firm in 
our sample; and it is potentially a good predictor of the share of family firms in a country. In 
addition to these two conditions, country-level family values shall not impact the performance of 
firms beyond the impact that comes through the channel we investigate. This exclusion 
restriction is hard to prove generically, but we argue that, empirically, it seems to be satisfied. In 
Table 7, columns (1) and (5), we regress firm performance on country-level family value with 
our usual set of controls. We find no direct effect of family value on average firm performance. 
19 
 
This finding is consistent with the notion that any impact of family value on the return gap goes 
through family ownership structure. 
--- Table 7 about here --- 
Table 7, columns (2) and (3), show the first stage regression for ROA, and columns (5) 
and (6) for ROCE. We instrument both the share of family firms and the interaction between 
family-firm share and LMR. As instruments, we use a dummy for high family values and the 
interaction between this dummy and LMR. We cluster the standard errors at country-year level. 
Panel A shows that both instruments have a significant impact on the share of family firms and 
on the interaction between the share of family firms and high LMR. High-family values are 
positively associated with presence of family firms.  First-stage F tests suggest that neither 
instrument is a weak instrument.  
 Columns (4) and (8) report second-stage regressions on our two alternative performance 
measures. After correcting for ownership choices, family firms have stronger performance and 
the effect remains statistically significant. More importantly, the interaction effect of LMR and 
Family Firm is negative and highly significant. When we instrument the choice of being a family 
firm, the impact of labor market regulation is significantly higher on the performance difference 
between family and non-family firms. The results confirm and strengthen our findings from 
previous sections and are consistent with the claim that labor market regulation has a causal 
impact on the performance difference between family and non-family firms. 
 
3.2.4 Submeasures of LMR  
We have established so far that the overall level of labor market regulation impacts the 
performance gap between family and non-family firms in a way that is consistent with the idea 
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that family firms are better able to protect labor in an environment where less regulatory 
protection exists. We now examine which dimensions of labor market regulation drive our result.  
 Table 8 estimates the performance difference between family firms and non-family firms, 
replacing the overall employment protection measure with each of its sub-components. We 
present results of OLS regressions in Panel A and results of IV regressions using family values 
as instruments in Panel B. For each LMR sub-measure, we present results for performance 
measured by ROA and ROCE. 
--- Table 8 about here --- 
We find that our results are driven by temporary employment protection and regular 
employment protection. Using temporary employment protection, we find that the interaction 
effect remains negative and statistically significant for both performance measures. 
Instrumenting the family firm dummy leads to similar results.  
 The analysis of permanent employment protection gains similar results. While the 
interaction effect is negative but statistically insignificant when we use OLS regressions, the 
effect becomes significant when instrumenting with family values. Finally, we document that 
collective dismissal does not drive our main result.  
Taken together, we conclude that the effect of employment protection on the performance 
difference between family and non-family firms is driven by temporary and regular labor 
protection. 
 
3.2.5 Industry effects 
The performance difference between family and non-family firms in low LMR countries depends 
on the advantages of having a better relationship with labor and on the cost of not being able to 
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downsize labor drastically when facing negative demand shocks. In this section, we illuminate 
the relative costs and benefits that family firms have in comparison to non-family firms in low 
LMR countries: We investigate how industry characteristics are associated with the magnitude of 
the performance difference. 
 Table 9 analyzes the relationship between industry-level characteristics likely to be 
affected by LMR and the performance difference between family and non-family firms. We 
follow exactly the set-up of Table 5 (Column 3) but additionally interact all key variables with 
industry characteristics. Our focus is on performance differentials in countries with weak labor 
market regulation. In order to facilitate interpretation of results, we flip the sign of labor market 
regulation: we introduce a dummy variable equal to one if a country has below-median labor 
market regulation. Our focus is on the interaction between family firms, labor market regulation, 
and industry characteristics. 
--- Table 9 about here --- 
We start by considering labor intensity. In labor-intense industries, it may be more costly 
not to be able to downsize the workforce when demand falls. Moreover, labor-intense industries 
often require less skilled workers: relationship-specific investment becomes less valuable. We 
hypothesize that the relative performance advantages of family firms in low LMR countries is 
stronger in less labor-intense industries.  
 We measure labor intensity at the industry level as the number of employees divided by 
the cost of goods sold (Compustat). Since we have relatively incomplete information on all the 
firms across industries in non-US countries, we categorize industries on the basis of US data and 
impose the resulting categories on our sample countries. Low (high) labor intensity is a dummy 
equal to one if an industry has below (above) median industry labor intensity in 1999.We find 
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that family firms do indeed obtain their performance advantage in low LMR countries from 
outperforming in less labor-intense industries. 
 Second, we investigate to what extent the performance advantage of family firms in low 
LMR countries is related to operating in less volatile environments. We argue that it is more 
costly to provide labor insurance in a more volatile environment. We therefore expect the 
performance advantage of family firms to stem from less volatile industries.  
 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 measure volatility as average stock return volatility in 
each Fama-French industry. Low (high) return volatility is a dummy equal to one if an industry 
has below (above) median industry return volatility in 1999. Again, due to limited availability of 
data for countries other than the US, we categorize industries in the US and impose resulting 
industry categories on our sample firms. We find the outperformance of family firms in low 
LMR countries is more pronounced in less volatile industries. We confirm this insight in 
columns (5) and (6), where we measure volatility by average industry stock return volatility. 
 Panel B of Table 9 proposes further industry splits. First, we split by labor unionization 
rates. Due to limited availability of data for countries other than the US, we categorize industries 
in the US and impose resulting industry categories on our sample firms. Unionization rate was 
obtained from U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, and it measures percentage of labor force that 
belongs to a labor union in each Fama-French industry. Low (high) unionization rate is a dummy 
equal to one if an industry has below (above) industry in 1999. The idea is that additional labor 
protection provided by family firms is less valuable in industries with high unionization rates. 
However, the results do not support this prediction. Second, we split by R&D intensity. We 
hypothesize that labor protection is more important in high-skill industries, yet this prediction is 
not confirmed in the data. Third, we split by product market competition, measured by a 
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measure of industry concentration. We find weak evidence that the 
performance gap is more pronounced in more competitive industries, in line with the notion that 
labor market competition increases the value of labor protection. Fourth, we consider labor force 
actions, measured by the accumulated number of strikes for each Fama-French industry over 
2002-2012, but find no significant results. 
 Overall, the evidence of this subsection highlights that implicit contracts are of more 
value where the costs of adjusting labor are lower. Specifically, family firms outperform non-
family firms in countries with weak LMR, particularly in less labor-intense and less volatile 
industries.  
 
3.3 Labor volatility 
The literature has highlighted that family firms have a different tradeoff between worker 
incentives and worker insurance than do non-family. Specifically, Sraer and Thesmar (2007), 
Bach and Serrano-Velarde (2014) and Bach and  Ellul et al (2014) document a lower volatility of 
labor in family firms and the latter paper furthermore point out that this is particularly the case 
when public unemployment insurance is less generous. We now investigate directly whether this 
channel may partly explain family firms’ performance advantage in countries with weak LMR.  
 In Table 10 we explain changes in labor volatility by LMR, Family firms, the interaction 
of the two, and all controls from our main specification in Table 5. Following Ellul et al. (2014) 
we measure labor volatility by the year-to-year % and the year-to-year log change in the number 
of employees, respectively. Consistent with the notion that family firms may provide insurance 
where LMR is otherwise weak, we find that labor volatility is significantly lower across family 
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firms in low LMR countries. Indeed, for a one standard deviation decline in LMR, family firms 
reduce labor volatility by 0.54 percentage points more than non-family firms.3 
--- Table 10 about here --- 
 Overall, this result suggests that the performance advantage of family firms in weak LMR 
countries is at least partly driven by family firms’ ability to provide additional protection against 
dismissal where labor protection is weak. 
 
3.4 Productivity analysis 
We have so far shown that family firms have a relative performance advantage in countries with 
weak LMR. As discussed above, many reasons may account for such an advantage, including 
better relationship with workers and entry and exit barriers. In this section, we investigate 
whether the advantage is channeled through a relative productivity advantage, i.e., whether 
family-controlled companies in countries with low LMR have higher productivity. 
 We use a simple total factor productivity model that follows Bloom and van Reenen 
(2007) in using the log of sales as dependent variable and log of assets; log of cost of goods sold; 
and log of number of employees as proxies for capital, material, and labor input, respectively. As 
before, we also control for firm age control and other country-level controls. The residual of this 
regression is firm productivity. In order to test whether LMR, family-firm dummy, and the 
interaction of the two explain differences in productivity, we add them to the regression on log of 
sales.4 If LMR, family-firm dummy and the interaction of the two load significantly, they are 
related to productivity. 
                                                            
3 The standard deviation of LMR is 0.765 in this sample. The unconditional mean year-to-year percentage change in the number 
of employees is 6.13%, suggesting an effect of 8.7%(=0.054%/6.13%).  
4 An alternative approach is to regress LMR, the family-firm dummy, and the interaction on the residual of the total factor 
productivity regression. We obtain similar results using this approach. 
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 Results are presented in Table 11 and suggest that family-controlled companies in 
countries with low overall LMR do not have higher productivity (Column 1). However, we do 
find a significant interaction effect with respect to the regulation collective dismissals. Thus, in 
countries with less protection against collective dismissals, evidence exists that family controlled 
corporations are less productive. 
--- Table 11 about here --- 
 
3.5 Labor Market Regulation versus other regulatory roadblocks 
We illustrated in the data section that variation in labor market regulation goes beyond variation 
in other country-level roadblocks and welfare; and, we controlled for the impact of these 
institutional roadblocks on performance in our previous analysis. In this section, we additionally 
investigate whether other institutional roadblocks lead to similar results. 
Table 12 uses the main regression setup of Table 5 (columns 3 and 6), replacing labor 
market regulation with measures of investor protection and economic development. In columns 
(1) and (2), we use the Anti-Self-Dealing index (see Djankov et al. 2008); in columns (3) and 4) 
we consider anti-director rights (La Porta et al. 1998, and Djankov et al. 2008); and in columns 
(5) and (6), we measure economic welfare through the logarithm of GDP per capita. We find that 
these roadblocks have very little explanatory power in explaining the performance difference 
between family and non-family firms. Only the interaction between the anti-self-dealing index 
and family firms is positive at a 10% significance level.  
--- Table 12 about here --- 
This confirms that labor market regulation is a type of regulation that impacts the relative 
performance of family and non-family firms beyond that of other types of regulation.  
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3.6 Alternative measures of employment protection 
Our LMR measures are based on data collected by the International Labor Organization, which 
relies on country officials and law experts to collect detailed information about firing procedures, 
notification rules, and group layoffs that are comparable across a wide range of countries. These 
LMR measures are useful for the purposes of our analysis as they focus on firing costs and how 
easy it is to separate workers from their jobs. As a further robustness check, we consider three 
additional labor regulation measures– Social Security Legislation (SSL), Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL), and Gross Replacement Rate (GRR) — that are available across countries, 
and conceptually capture some aspects of LMR in our data.  
 SSL, or Social Security Legislation, as introduced by Botero et al. (2004), measures the 
level of unemployment benefits. SSL itself is an average of four normalized variables that 
capture of unemployment insurance. EPL, or Employment Protection Legislation against 
Dismissal, also from Botero et al. (2004), measures worker protection granted by low or 
mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. EPL is the average of seven dummy 
variables that capture the legal obstacles employers face when dismissing employees. Finally, 
GRR, or the Gross Replacement Rate, introduced by Aleksynska and Schindler (2001), measures 
unemployment benefits of dismissed employees as a fraction of employee earnings. Among 
these alternatives, EPL is closer related to our LMR measure, since it focuses on the specific 
legal rules that apply to the dismissal of employees. Empirically, the correlations of LMR with 
these alternative measures are 0.68 for SSL, -0.52 for EPL, and 0.02 for GRR.  
In Table 13 we use SSL, EPL, and GRR instead of our LMR measure to replicate our 
main results from Table 5. Specifically, the table shows regressions that correspond to Columns 
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3 and 6 in Table 5, where Alternative Measure represents the alternative country-level labor 
regulation variable. While coefficients are not directly comparable because of different scaling of 
the labor regulation variables, the results show that in all regressions the Family Firm dummy 
maintains its positive sign, and its interaction with Alternative Measure maintains its negative 
sign (coefficients are not significantly different from zero for EPL however). 
--- Table 13 about here --- 
Overall, this confirms that our main results also obtain for a range of alternative measures 
of labor market regulation. Because these alternative measures focus on several different aspects 
of labor market relations, and some of these differences are more subtle than we can capture 
here, we treat these results as a robustness test only. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A large number of publicly traded firms around the world continue to be controlled by families. 
The performance differential between family- and non-family-controlled firms has been 
extensively studied, yet only recently has the literature attempted to explain how family control 
may affect firm performance through the specific channel of labor relations. This paper provides 
new evidence on how labor market regulation at the country level affects the performance 
differential between family-controlled companies and non-family-controlled companies. Using 
firm-level data for more than 6,900 firms in 28 countries, we establish two main results. First, 
family firms have a performance advantage over non-family firms in countries with a lower level 
of labor market regulation. Second, the performance advantage of being family controlled in 
countries with lower regulation is less pronounced in industries with high labor intensity and 
high labor volatility. Our results suggest that family control and labor market regulation are—at 
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least to some extent—substitute governance mechanisms. This interpretation is supported by 
evidence that the performance advantage of family firms diminishes as labor market regulation 
strengthens.  
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Figure 1: OECD employment protection measures 
This figure summarizes the compilation of the OECD employment protection measure. The overall measure is 
constructed by weighting three sub-measures: (i) individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts (weighted 
with 5/12), (ii) regulation of temporary contracts (weighted with 5/12), and (ii) additional costs for collective 
dismissals (weighted with 2/12). Measure (i), which is henceforth referred to as regular employment protection, is 
the equally weighted mean of measures for procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault 
individual dismissals, and difficulty of dismissal. Measure (ii), which is henceforth referred to as temporary 
employment protection, is the equally weighted mean of measures of fixed-term contract conditions and temporary 
work agency employment. Measure (iii) is henceforth referred to as collective dismissal protection. 
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Figure 2: Labor market regulation and other country-level measures 
This figure plots the overall OECD Labor Market Regulation measure against various country-level measures in 
2008 for the 28 sample countries. Panel A and B focus on investor protection measures: Djankov et al.’s (2008) 
Anti-Self-Dealing index and La Porta et al.’s (1998) Anti-Director index. Panels C and D show GDP per capita 
(where growth is measured relative to 2003). Panels E and F show two of the OECD Product Market Regulation 
measures: the overall product market regulation measure, and the barriers to entrepreneurship measure. Each ‘x’ 
reflects a country observation in 2008. 
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Figure 3: Performance difference and labor market regulation 
This figure illustrates the relation between the performance difference of family versus non-family firms and labor 
market regulation. Each ‘x’ reflects one sample country. Labor market regulation is measured using the OECD 
Overall Labor Protection measure. Panel A plots the average performance difference between family firms and non-
family firms against the Overall Labor Protection measure. The performance difference is calculated country by 
country as the difference between average return on assets of family firms and average return on assets of non-
family firms in 2008. Panel B considers the relation between changes in return on assets and changes in Overall 
Labor Protection between 2003 and 2008 for family firms (left) and non-family firms (right). The x-axis reflects the 
change in Overall Labor Protection from 2008 to 2003. The y-axis reflects the difference between average returns on 
assets in 2008 and average returns on assets in 2003. Panel C considers the difference in difference. The x-axis 
reflects the change in Overall Labor Protection from 2008 to 2003. The y-axis shows the change in returns on assets 
of family firms from 2003 to 2008 and the change in return on assets of non-family firms. 
 
Panel A: Performance gap and labor market regulation 
 
 
Panel B: Changes in return on assets and changes in labor market regulation
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Panel C: Difference in difference: Changes in the performance gap and changes in labor market regulation 
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Table 1: Sample countries 
This table presents country-level summary statistics for each country used in this study. Sample countries are those in Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) for which 
the OECD provides Labor Market Regulation (LMR) measures in 2008. The OECD provides four Labor Market Regulation measures: overall employment 
protection along with three sub-measures (collective dismissal protection, regular employment protection, and temporary employment protection). Labor Market 
Regulation is measured on a scale from 0 to 5, 0 denoting weak labor market regulation and 5 denoting strong labor market regulation. Also reported are two 
investor protection measures: anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al. 2008) and anti-director index (La Porta et al. 1998, Djankov et al. 2008), log of GDP per capita 
(from the World Bank), and four OECD competition measures (overall product market regulation and three sub-measures: barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers 
to trade and investment, and state control). Countries are sorted by Overall LMR, starting with the country with weakest LMR. 
 
Country 
Overall 
LMR 
Collective 
Dismissal Regular LMR Temporary LMR
Anti-Self-
dealing 
Anti-Director 
Index 
Log(GDP per 
capita) 
Product Market 
Regulation 
Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship 
Barriers to 
Trade & 
Investment 
State 
Control
United Kingdom .74 2.88 1.12 .37 .95 4 10.47 .78 .87 .05 1.43 
Canada .75 2.63 1.25 .25 .64 4 10.41 1.02 1.16 .45 1.44 
Ireland 1.07 2.38 1.6 .55 .79 4 10.71 1.01 1.2 .15 1.66 
Switzerland 1.14 3.88 1.16 1.13 .27 3 10.81 1.3 1.48 .21 2.22 
Australia 1.18 2.88 1.47 .88 .76 3 10.36 1.2 1.21 .46 1.94 
South Africa 1.25 1.88 1.99 .5 .81 5 8.39 1.94 2.17 1.35 2.47 
Israel 1.37 1.88 1.87 .88 .73 3 9.94 2.13 2.08 1.21 3.11 
Japan 1.43 1.5 1.87 1 .5 5 10.46 1.24 1.36 .53 1.82 
New Zealand 1.45 .38 1.67 1.25 .95 5 10.07 1.23 1.6 .43 1.66 
Denmark 1.5 3.55 1.63 1.38 .46 4 10.73 1.03 1.24 .5 1.36 
Italy 1.88 4.88 1.77 1.99 .42 2 10.28 1.46 1.25 .55 2.59 
Austria 1.99 3.25 2.49 1.5 .21 4 10.49 1.48 1.36 .85 2.24 
South Korea 2 1.88 2.37 1.63 .47 4 9.67 1.6 1.37 1.36 2.06 
Finland 2.01 2.57 2.17 1.85 .46 4 10.5 1.16 1.38 .25 1.84 
Netherlands 2.07 3 2.96 1.19 .2 4 10.55 1.04 1.17 .17 1.76 
Germany 2.14 3.75 2.89 1.39 .28 4 10.4 1.36 1.49 .57 2.02 
Sweden 2.16 3.75 2.86 1.46 .33 4 10.57 1.3 1.02 .36 2.51 
Belgium 2.18 4.13 1.73 2.63 .54 2 10.45 1.42 1.58 .14 2.55 
Norway 2.62 2.88 2.25 2.99 .42 4 11.03 1.23 1.22 .5 1.97 
Chile 2.65 0 2.67 2.63 .63 5 8.86 1.43 1.5 .45 2.34 
Brazil 2.75 0 1.37 4.13 .27 5 8.48 1.67 1.97 .99  
India 2.77 0 3.54 2 .58 4 6.59 2.25 2.73 1.6 2.78 
Greece 2.9 3.25 2.31 3.49 .22 3 9.94 2.36 2.14 1.09 3.87 
Spain 3 3.13 2.49 3.5 .37 5 10.11 1.18 1.34 .17 2.01 
France 3.05 2.13 2.47 3.63 .38 5 10.39 1.49 1.45 .3 2.71 
Mexico 3.13 3.75 2.25 4 .17 2 8.98 1.72 2.29 .99 1.86 
Portugal 3.43 2.66 4.16 2.7 .44 3 9.78 1.43 1.31 .28 2.69 
Turkey 3.72 2.21 2.56 4.88 .43 4 8.73 2.26 2.5 .37 3.91 
Column Mean 2.08 2.54 2.18 1.99 0.49 3.86 9.93 1.45 1.55 0.58 2.25 
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Table 2: Country-level correlations 
This table presents country-level correlations for the four Labor Market Regulation measures and further country-level controls described in Table 1. 
Observations are equally weighted by country. 
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Table 3: Sample firms 
This table provides firm-level summary statistics. Panel A shows the number of unique sample firms in the sample 
period 2001-2009, the number of family firms, and the fraction of family firms by country. Countries are those in 
Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) for which the OECD provides Labor Market Regulation measures. Family firm is 
a dummy variable that equals one if voting rights held by an individual or a group of family members exceed 25%, 
directly or via a control chain. Panel B provides firm-year level summary statistics of key control variables. ROA (%) 
is EBIT over Total Assets. ROCE (%) is EBIT over Total Assets less Current Liabilities. Log(Assets) is log of assets 
in USD. R&D/Assets is R&D expense over total assets. Leverage is debt over total assets. Log(Age) is the log of 
years since firm foundation or the log of years since the firm first appeared in Datastream if the foundation year is 
missing. Log(Cost of goods sold) and Log(Employees) are the log of COGS in USD and the log of the number of 
employees, respectively. 
Panel A: Family firms by country 
Country # Firms # Family Firms Percent Family Firms
Australia 763 42 5.50
Austria 39 7 17.95
Belgium 73 16 21.92
Brazil 96 6 6.25
Canada 430 21 4.88
Chile 58 2 3.45
Denmark 67 7 10.45
Finland 83 7 8.43
France 408 146 35.78
Germany 336 108 32.14
Greece 89 30 33.71
India 328 24 7.32
Ireland 36 3 8.33
Israel 38 4 10.53
Italy 154 49 31.82
Japan 1593 11 0.69
Korea 491 115 23.42
Mexico 39 5 12.82
Netherlands 84 9 10.71
New Zealand 46 3 6.52
Norway 71 14 19.72
Portugal 31 5 16.13
South Africa 115 16 13.91
Spain 88 20 22.73
Sweden 128 12 9.38
Switzerland 137 21 15.33
Turkey 114 27 23.68
United Kingdom 1048 90 8.59
SUM 6983 820 11.74
 
Panel B: Firm-level summary statistics 
 N Mean Median SD 25th pctl. 75th pctl. 
ROA (%) 48,062 3.80% 6.04% 22.77% 1.52% 11.32% 
ROCE(%) 48,062 9.12% 10.77% 42.69% 2.98% 20.11% 
Log(Assets) 48,062 12.7 12.7 2.1 11.3 14.0 
R&D/Assets 48,062 2.50% 0.00% 7.57% 0.00% 1.45% 
Leverage 48,062 50.78% 52.05% 23.48% 34.14% 66.92% 
Age 48,062 15.3 13.0 10.3 7.0 20.0 
Log(Cost of goods sold) 46,042 12.0 12.3 2.7 10.9 13.6 
Log(Employees) 40,566 7.1 7.2 2.1 5.9 8.4 
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Table 4: Univariate performance splits by family control 
This table compares operating performance of family and non-family firms in countries with low and high overall 
labor market protection, respectively. Operating performance is measured by return on assets and return on capital 
employed. The labor market protection split is performed year by year at the country level. ***, **, and * denote a 
significant differences in means at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Labor market regulation, family firms, and firm performance 
This table reports results of OLS regressions for firm performance. The sample period is 2001-2009, and 
observations are at firm-year level. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA; columns 1-3) and return on 
capital employed (ROCE; columns 4-6), respectively. The key explanatory variable is the Overall OECD Labor 
Market Regulation measure, which is lagged by one year. Family firm is a dummy variable that equals one if voting 
rights held by an individual or a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control chain. All firm-level 
controls from Worldscope and Datastream are lagged by one year. R&D/Assets is R&D expense divided by total 
assets. Leverage is debt divided by total assets. Log(Age) is the log of years since firm foundation or the log of years 
since the firm first appeared in Datastream if the foundation year is missing. Country-level controls include Djankov 
et al. (2008) ’s Anti-Self Dealing index, La Porta et al. (1998)’s Anti-Director index, and log of GDP per capita from 
World Bank. Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROA ROA ROCE ROCE ROCE 
       
Labor Market Reg. (LMR) 0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.011 
 (0.37) (-0.02) (0.29) (0.85) (0.48) (0.77) 
Family Firm  0.027*** 0.053***  0.042*** 0.085*** 
  (3.43) (4.39)  (3.11) (7.55) 
LMR*Family Firm   -0.013**   -0.021*** 
   (-2.61)   (-3.59) 
Log(Assets) 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (3.52) (3.55) (3.55) (4.57) (4.61) (4.60) 
R&D/Assets -0.030 -0.026 -0.025 0.298 0.303 0.305 
 (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.21) (1.55) (1.58) (1.59) 
Leverage 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.199** 0.196** 0.196** 
 (1.12) (1.10) (1.10) (2.37) (2.36) (2.36) 
Log(Age) -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 
 (-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-1.11) (-1.07) (-1.07) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.068*** 
 (-5.65) (-6.19) (-6.00) (-4.62) (-4.94) (-4.83) 
Anti Self -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 0.040 0.038 0.042 
 (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.22) (0.84) (0.81) (0.87) 
Anti Director 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.27) (0.46) (0.52) (-0.36) (-0.21) (-0.16)
       
Observations 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 
R-squared 0.157 0.158 0.159 0.121 0.122 0.122 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Firm performance for matched samples 
This table presents the main result using a sample of matched firms. Each year, non-family firms are matched to 
family firms by country characteristics (log of GDP per capita, anti self-dealing, anti director index), industry, 
log(assets), R&D/assets, leverage, and age using propensity score-matching. Panel A provides a univariate split by 
family firm identifier of the propensity score as well as of the key operating performance measures. Panel B repeats 
the analysis of Table 4 for the matched sample. Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are 
in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered 
at country level. 
Panel A: Outcome of propensity score matching  
 Non-family Family p-value 
Propensity Score 22.57% 22.57% .99 
ROA 4.67% 6.41% <0.01 
ROCE 2.62% 5.26% <0.01 
 
Panel B: Regressions using matched sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROA ROA ROCE ROCE ROCE 
       
Labor Market Reg. (LMR) -0.008 -0.007 0.019 -0.011 -0.010 0.021* 
 (-1.68) (-1.54) (1.68) (-1.67) (-1.54) (1.91) 
Family Firm  0.014 0.086***  0.021* 0.109*** 
  (1.34) (2.88)  (1.71) (4.36) 
LMR*Family Firm   -0.031***   -0.038*** 
   (-2.88)   (-4.11) 
Log(Assets) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (3.65) (3.66) (3.67) (4.14) (4.15) (4.16) 
R&D/Assets -0.157* -0.156* -0.158* -0.148 -0.147 -0.150 
 (-1.94) (-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.02) 
Leverage 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.024 0.026 0.028 
 (0.41) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (0.54) (0.58) 
Log(Age) 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (1.23) (1.21) (1.14) (0.91) (0.88) (0.77) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 (-7.95) (-7.86) (-7.95) (-11.99) (-12.05) (-12.27) 
Anti Self -0.028 -0.029 -0.033 -0.030 -0.032 -0.037 
 (-1.03) (-1.09) (-1.27) (-1.00) (-1.08) (-1.27) 
Anti Director 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
 (3.62) (3.60) (3.55) (2.25) (2.26) (2.26) 
       
Observations 6436 6436 6436 6436 6436 6436 
R-squared 0.123 0.124 0.126 0.091 0.092 0.093 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7: Instrumental variable regressions 
This table reports results of IV regressions for firm performance. The labor market regulation measure is overall labor market protection measure. We instrument both LMR and 
LMR*Family Firm. The instruments are High Family Value and interaction of High Family Value and LMR measures. We obtain family firm values from World Value Survey. 
The survey asks the question of how important the family is in the respondent’s life (Question: a001), and respondents assign a score of one to three (1=not very important and 
3=very important) to the question. We measure the family value at country-year level by averaging across respondents’ family value scores in each year and High family value is 
equal to one if country has an above median family value score in that year. Columns (1)-(4) show IV regression results for ROA, and columns (5)-(8) show regression results for 
ROCE. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country-year level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Exclusion 
Restriction First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Exclusion 
Restriction First Stage First Stage Second Stage 
  ROA Family Firm LMR*Family Firm ROA ROCE Family Firm LMR*Family Firm ROCE 
Family Firm 0.248 0.388 
(3.705)*** (3.068)*** 
LMR*Family Firm -0.408 -0.680 
(-2.649)*** (-2.083)** 
Family Value 0.036 0.197 0.052 -0.326 0.197 0.052 
(0.175) (12.287)*** (5.213)*** (-0.963) (12.287)*** (5.213)*** 
LMR*Family Value 0.088 -0.288 -0.144 0.405 -0.288 -0.144 
(0.402) (-10.435)*** (-5.538)*** (1.109) (-10.435)*** (-5.538)*** 
LMR -0.246 0.207 0.280 0.068 -1.148 0.207 0.280 0.122 
(-0.392) (3.727)*** (6.256)*** (2.137)** (-1.107) (3.727)*** (6.256)*** (1.787)* 
Log(Assets) 0.034 -0.009 -0.005 0.034 0.050 -0.009 -0.005 0.050 
(3.398)*** (-6.304)*** (-3.973)*** (9.469)*** (4.451)*** (-6.304)*** (-3.973)*** (11.168)*** 
R&D/Assets -0.035 -0.155 -0.033 -0.012 0.288 -0.155 -0.033 0.323 
(-0.286) (-7.928)*** (-2.633)*** (-0.247) (1.479) (-7.928)*** (-2.633)*** (3.956)*** 
Leverage 0.052 0.037 0.014 0.049 0.201 0.037 0.014 0.197 
(1.084) (3.584)*** (1.659)* (2.664)*** (2.249)** (3.584)*** (1.659)* (6.026)*** 
Log(Age) -0.008 -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.022 -0.013 -0.006 -0.020 
(-0.591) (-4.564)*** (-2.919)*** (-1.240) (-1.188) (-4.564)*** (-2.919)*** (-2.530)** 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.037 0.022 0.038 -0.028 -0.069 0.022 0.038 -0.053 
(-5.813)*** (4.507)*** (9.582)*** (-5.612)*** (-4.414)*** (4.507)*** (9.582)*** (-4.657)*** 
Anti Self -0.015 -0.344 -0.086 0.005 0.067 -0.344 -0.086 0.056 
(-0.333) (-10.866)*** (-5.274)*** (0.315) (1.006) (-10.866)*** (-5.274)*** (2.484)** 
Anti Director 0.003 0.009 0.022 0.017 -0.003 0.009 0.022 0.020 
(0.417) (1.019) (3.913)*** (3.258)*** (-0.248) (1.019) (3.913)*** (1.912)* 
Observations 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 
R-squared 0.160 0.115 0.227 0.098 0.124 0.115 0.227 0.073 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Sub-measures of labor market regulation 
Panel A reports results of OLS regressions for firm performance following table 4. Panel B reports second stage of 
IV regression for firm performance following Table 7. The sample period is 2001-2009, and observations are at 
firm-year level. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA; columns 1, 3, 5) and return on capital employed 
(ROCE; columns 2, 4, 6), respectively. In columns (1)-(2), the key explanatory variable is temporary employment 
protection, a sub-measure of the overall labor market regulation measure. In columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), the key 
explanatory variable is regular employment protection and collective dismissal protection, both sub-measures of the 
overall labor market regulation measure, respectively. Family firm is a dummy variable that equals one if voting 
rights held by an individual or through a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control chain. All 
firm-level controls from Worldscope and Datastream follow Table 4 and are omitted for brevity. Country-level 
controls include Djankov et al. (2008)’s Anti-Self Dealing index, La Porta et al.(1998)’s Anti-Director index, and log 
of GDP per capita from World Bank. Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at 
country-year level. 
 
Panel A OLS Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary Temporary Regular Regular CollDismiss CollDismiss 
ROA ROCE ROA ROCE ROA ROCE 
LMR 0.004 0.012 -0.01 -0.018 0.006 0.01 
(1.01) (1.70) (-1.27) (-1.37) (0.81) (0.65) 
Family Firm 0.043 0.077 0.05 0.052 0.044 0.062 
(4.37)*** (6.39)*** (2.90)*** (1.72)* (2.27)** (1.84)* 
LMR*Family Firm -0.009 -0.019 -0.01 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 
(-2.63)** (-5.01)*** (-1.49) (-0.22) (-1.40) (-0.68) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 48,062 48,062 48,062 48,062 48,062 48,062 
R-squared 0.159 0.123 0.159 0.122 0.159 0.122 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B IV Regressions-Second Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Temporary Temporary Regular Regular CollDismiss CollDismiss 
ROA ROCE ROA ROCE ROA ROCE 
              
LMR 0.043 0.075 0.081 0.146 -0.074 -0.329 
(2.270)** (2.093)** (2.181)** (1.986)** (-0.344) (-0.401) 
Family Firm 0.516 0.749 1.937 3.294 0.390 0.319 
(3.364)*** (2.961)*** (2.588)*** (2.218)** (0.682) (0.161) 
LMR*Family Firm -0.214 -0.334 -0.747 -1.279 0.100 0.764 
(-2.713)*** (-2.372)** (-2.444)** (-2.115)** (0.146) (0.301) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 45,770 
R-squared 0.228 0.187 0.132 0.061 0.059 0.021 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
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Table 9: Industry splits 
This table reports OLS regressions of firm performance (Return on Assets). The sample period is 2001-2009, and 
observations are at firm-year level. Low Labor Market Regulation and Family firm are dummy variables defined as 
before. In Panel A, Low Labor Industry is a dummy equal to one if a firm operates in a Fama-French 48 industry in 
the bottom-tercile (odd-numbered columns) or below-median (even-numbered columns) by labor intensity, labor 
volatility, and return volatility. In Panel B, splits are by labor unionization, R&D, product market regulation, and 
labor force actions. Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. 
Panel A: Labor intensity, labor volatility, return volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Labor Intensity  Labor Volatility Return Volatility  
 P33 Median P33 Median P33 Median 
       
Low Labor Market Regulation (LMR) -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.47) (-0.55) (-0.30) (-0.80) (-0.50) (-0.66) 
Family Firm 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.022** 0.018** 0.027*** 0.022***
 (3.52) (2.81) (2.10) (2.52) (3.70) (3.75) 
Low LMR*Family Firm -0.015 0.010 -0.007 0.012 -0.004 0.012 
 (-1.18) (0.87) (-0.61) (1.14) (-0.55) (1.52) 
Low LMR*Low Labor Industry 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.009 0.001 0.004 
 (0.20) (0.22) (-0.14) (0.57) (0.16) (0.90) 
Family Firm*Low Labor Industry -0.025* -0.014 -0.009 -0.003 -0.018** -0.013 
 (-1.76) (-1.09) (-0.48) (-0.24) (-2.28) (-1.64) 
Low LMR*Family Firm* 0.052** 0.022 0.042** 0.014 0.037** 0.018 
   Low Labor Industry (2.45) (1.23) (2.15) (0.76) (2.67) (1.42) 
       
Observations 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 
R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country 
Panel B: Labor unionization, R&D, product market competition, and labor force actions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Labor Unionization R&D Product Mkt 
Comp 
Labor Force 
Actions 
 P33 Median P33 Median P33 Median P33 Median 
         
Low Labor Mkt Reg (LMR) -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.020 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.32) (-0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.80) (0.77) (-0.28) (-0.38) 
Family Firm 0.009 0.005 0.029*** 0.029*** -0.033 -0.045 0.018 0.015 
 (0.72) (0.41) (3.31) (2.94) (-1.06) (-1.30) (1.42) (1.28) 
Low LMR*Family Firm 0.031* 0.035* 0.020** 0.018* 0.123 0.183** 0.022 0.033* 
 (1.85) (1.87) (2.42) (1.94) (1.67) (2.07) (1.29) (1.99) 
Low LMR*Low Lbr Ind -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.022 -0.024 -0.002 0.001 
 (-0.03) (-0.19) (-0.55) (-0.30) (-1.20) (-0.95) (-0.21) (0.08) 
Family Firm*Low Lbr Ind 0.017 0.022 -0.015 -0.013 0.050 0.062 -0.002 0.003 
 (1.20) (1.43) (-0.86) (-0.97) (1.38) (1.57) (-0.17) (0.27) 
Low LMR*Family Firm* -0.027 -0.031 -0.010 -0.001 -0.104 -0.164* -0.004 -0.021 
   Low Lbr Ind (-1.19) (-1.32) (-0.47) (-0.04) (-1.44) (-1.87) (-0.23) (-1.45) 
         
Observations 48062 48062 40765 40765 48062 48062 48062 48062 
R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.163 0.163 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
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Table 10: Labor market regulation, family firms and labor volatility 
This table reports results of OLS regressions for labor volatility. The left-hand side variable is the percentage change 
in the number of employees from year to year (Columns 1 and 2) and the log change in the number of employees 
from year to year (Columns 3 and 4) as in Ellul et al. 2014. LMR is the Overall OECD Labor Market Regulation 
measure, which is lagged by one year. Family firm is a Dummy variable that equals one if voting rights held by an 
individual or a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control chain. All firm-level controls are 
constructed as in Table 5 and lagged by one year. Country-level controls include Djankov et al.’s (2008) Anti-Self 
Dealing index, La Porta et al. (1998)’s Anti-Director index, and log of GDP per capita from World Bank. 
Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at country level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
% Change in 
employment 
% Change in 
employment 
Log(Change in 
employment) 
Log(Change in 
employment) 
     
LMR 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (1.58) (1.04) (0.80) (0.36) 
Family Firm -0.005 -0.020** -0.001 -0.015** 
 (-0.94) (-2.46) (-0.24) (-2.21) 
LMR*Family Firm  0.007**  0.007** 
  (2.15)  (2.50) 
     
Observations 38860 38860 38860 38860 
R-squared 0.076 0.076 0.071 0.071 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table 11: Total factor productivity 
This table reports results of OLS regressions for Total Factor Productivity. The sample period is 2001-2009, and 
observations are at firm-year level. The dependent variable is productivity measured by the log of sales. In Column 
(1), the key explanatory variable is the Overall OECD Labor Market Regulation measure, which is lagged by one 
year. In columns (2)-(4), the key explanatory variable is a sub-measure of the overall measure: temporary protection, 
regular employment protection, and collective dismissal employment protection, respectively, also lagged by one 
year. Family firm is a dummy variable that equals one if voting rights held by an individual or a group of family 
members exceed 25%, directly or via a control chain. All firm-level controls from Worldscope and Datastream are 
lagged by one year. Log(Assets), Log(COGS), and Log (Employees) are the log of total assets, cost of goods sold, 
and number of employees, respectively. These measures serve as proxies for capital, material, and labor input. 
Log(Age) is the log of years since firm foundation or the log of years since the firm first appeared in Datastream if 
the foundation year is missing. Log(Assets) is the log of total assets. Country-level controls include Djankov et al. 
(2008)’s  Anti-Self Dealing index, La Porta et al. (1998)’s Anti-Director index, and log of GDP per capita from 
World Bank. Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall Temporary Regular Collective Dismissal 
  Log(sales) Log(sales) Log(sales) Log(sales) 
     
LMR -0.086** -0.033 -0.106** 0.091** 
 (-2.46) (-1.50) (-2.19) (2.71) 
Family Firm 0.143* 0.106* 0.173 -0.163* 
 (1.72) (1.77) (1.69) (-2.01) 
Family*LMR -0.027 -0.014 -0.048 0.066** 
 (-0.85) (-0.70) (-1.17) (2.69) 
Log(Assets) 0.342*** 0.343*** 0.341*** 0.350*** 
 (13.73) (13.66) (13.60) (13.75) 
Log(COGS) 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.546*** 
 (22.54) (22.50) (22.27) (22.55) 
Log(Employees) 0.201** 0.199** 0.200** 0.187** 
 (2.75) (2.72) (2.72) (2.58) 
Log(Age) -0.072** -0.069* -0.066* -0.059* 
 (-2.11) (-2.04) (-1.95) (-1.80) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.020 0.001 -0.024 -0.042** 
 (-0.68) (0.04) (-0.90) (-2.06) 
Anti-Self-Dealing -0.153 -0.039 -0.153 0.122 
 (-1.04) (-0.29) (-1.17) (1.21) 
Anti-Director 0.056* 0.053 0.061* 0.144*** 
 (1.76) (1.60) (2.00) (2.88) 
     
Observations 39996 39996 39996 39996 
R-squared 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering Country Country Country Country 
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Table 12: Alternative roadblocks 
This table reports results on the interaction between Family Firms and roadblocks other than LMR. It constitutes a 
robustness test to Table 5, following columns (3) and (6) of Table 5 exactly. The sample period is 2001-2009, and 
observations are at firm-year level. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA; odd-numbered columns) and 
return on capital employed (ROCE; even-numbered columns), respectively. The key explanatory variable is Djankov 
et al.’s (2008) Anti-Self-Dealing index (columns 1 and 2), La Porta et al.’s (1998) Anti-Director index (columns 3 
and 4), and log of GDP per capita from the World Bank (columns 5 and 6). Family firm is a dummy variable that 
equals one if voting rights held by an individual or a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control 
chain. Firm-level controls, lagged by one year, include R&D/Assets (R&D expense divided by total assets), 
Leverage (debt divided by total assets), and Log(Age) (the log of years since firm foundation or the log of years 
since the firm first appeared in Datastream if the foundation year is missing). Regressions include year- and 
industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Anti-Self Dealing Anti-Director Index Log(GDP per capita) 
  ROA ROCE ROA ROCE ROA ROCE 
       
Roadblock -0.014 0.037 0.002 -0.005 -0.038*** -0.073*** 
 (-0.42) (0.77) (0.29) (-0.43) (-5.66) (-5.09) 
Family Firm 0.007 0.037 0.003 -0.031 0.004 -0.014 
 (0.61) (1.18) (0.08) (-0.61) (0.09) (-0.19) 
Roadblock*Family Firm 0.038* 0.013 0.006 0.019 0.002 0.006 
 (1.85) (0.27) (0.67) (1.22) (0.49) (0.73) 
       
Observations 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 
R-squared 0.158 0.122 0.158 0.122 0.158 0.122 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table 13: Alternative measures of employee protection 
This table reports results of OLS regressions for firm performance. It replicates the main result (Table 5, Columns 3 
and 6) using alternative measures of labor regulation. The left-hand side variable is ROA in odd-numbered columns 
and ROCE in even-numbered columns. Columns 1 and 2 report results using Social Security Legislation (SSL) from 
Botero et al. (2004). SSL measures the level of unemployment benefits as the average of the following four 
normalized variables: (1) the number of months of contributions or employment required to qualify for 
unemployment benefits by law; (2) the percentage of the worker's monthly salary deducted by law to cover 
unemployment benefits; (3) the waiting period for unemployment benefits; and (4) the percentage of the net salary 
covered by the net unemployment benefits in case of a one-year unemployment spell. Columns 3 and 4 report results 
using Employment Protection Legislation against Dismissal (EPL) from Botero et al. (2004). EPL measures worker 
protection granted by law or mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following 
seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing more than 
one worker; (2) if the employer needs the approval of a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker; (3) if 
the employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker; (4) if the employer needs the 
approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker; (5) if the employer must provide relocation or retraining 
alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal; (6) if there are priority rules applying to dismissal or lay-
offs; and (7) if there are priority rules applying to re-employment. Columns 5 and 6 report results using the Gross 
Replacement Rate (GRR) for 2005 as used by Aleksynska and Schindler (2011) and Ellul et al. 2014. GRR 
measures unemployment insurance benefits received by a worker over the first two years of unemployment as a 
fraction of the worker’s last gross earnings. Family firm is a Dummy variable that equals one if voting rights held by 
an individual or a group of family members exceed 25%, directly or via a control chain. All firm-level controls from 
Worldscope and Datastream are lagged by one year. R&D/Assets is R&D expense divided by total assets. Leverage 
is debt divided by total assets. Log(Age) is the log of years since firm foundation or the log of years since the firm 
first appeared in Datastream if the foundation year is missing. Country-level controls include Djankov et al.’s (2008) 
Anti-Self Dealing index, La Porta et al. (1998)’s Anti-Director index, and log of GDP per capita from World Bank. 
Regressions include year- and industry-fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at country level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SSL SSL EPL EPL GRR GRR 
  ROA ROCE ROA ROCE ROA ROCE 
       
Alternative Measure 0.012 0.001 0.009 0.076 0.080** 0.127** 
 (0.91) (0.05) (0.21) (0.81) (2.65) (2.25) 
Family Firm 0.049*** 0.065*** 0.033** 0.043 0.059*** 0.092*** 
 (5.39) (5.07) (2.53) (1.48) (4.60) (4.71) 
Alternative Measure*Family Firm -0.052*** -0.048* -0.008 -0.001 -0.125*** -0.191*** 
 (-3.42) (-1.76) (-0.44) (-0.02) (-3.92) (-4.02) 
       
Observations 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 48062 
R-squared 0.159 0.122 0.158 0.122 0.160 0.123 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country 
 
 
